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91_321a
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being
done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United ______
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.______ ___________________
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ITEL CONTAINERS INTERNATIONAL CORP. v. HUDDLESTON, COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE OF ____
TENNESSEE
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
No. 91-321. Argued October 14, 1992 - Decided February 23, 1993
Petitioner Itel Containers is a domestic company that leases cargo containers
for use exclusively in international shipping. After paying under protest a
Tennessee sales tax on its proceeds from the lease of containers delivered in
the State, Itel filed a refund action, challenging the tax's constitutionality
under the Commerce, Import-Export, and Supremacy Clauses. The last challenge
was based on an alleged conflict with federal regulations and with two
international Container Conventions signed by the United States: the 1956
Convention prohibiting the imposition of a tax ``chargeable by reason of
importation,'' and the 1972 Convention prohibiting taxes ``collected on, or in
connexion with, the importation of goods.'' The State Chancery Court reduced
the assessment on state-law grounds but rejected the constitutional claims,
and the State Supreme Court affirmed.
Held: Tennessee's sales tax, as applied to Itel's leases, does not violate the_____
Commerce, Import-Export, or Supremacy Clause. Pp. 3-17.
(a) The sales tax is not pre-empted by the 1972 or 1956 Container
Convention. The Conventions' text makes clear that only those taxes imposed
based on the act of importation itself are disallowed, not, as Itel contends,
all taxes on international cargo containers. The fact that other signatory
nations may place only an indirect value added tax (VAT) on container leases
does not demonstrate that Tennessee's direct tax on container leases is
prohibited, because the Conventions do not distinguish between direct and
indirect taxes. While the VAT system is not equivalent to Tennessee's sales
tax for the purposes of calculation and assessment, it is equivalent for
purposes of the Conventions: neither imposes a tax based on importation. The
I II ITEL CONTAINERS INT'L CORP. v. HUDDLESTON ____
Syllabus
Federal Government agrees with this Court's interpretation of the Container
Conventions, advocating a position that does not conflict with the one it took
in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434. Pp. 3-8. ________________ ______________________
(b) The tax, which applies to domestic and foreign goods without
differentiation, does not impede the federal objectives expressed in the
Conventions and related federal statutes and regulations. The federal
regulatory scheme for containers used in foreign commerce discloses no
congressional intent to exempt those containers from all or most domestic
taxation, in contrast to the regulatory scheme for customs bonded warehouses,
which pre-empts most state taxes on warehoused goods, see, e.g., McGoldrick v. ________________
Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U. S. 414. Nor is the scheme so pervasive that it ________________
demonstrates a federal purpose to occupy the field of container regulation and
taxation. The precise federal policy regarding promotion of container use is
satisfied by a limited proscription against taxes that are imposed upon or
discriminate against the containers' importation. Pp. 8-10.
(c) The tax does not violate the foreign commerce clause under Japan Line's __________
three-part test. First, as concluded by the State Supreme Court and accepted
by Itel, the tax satisfies the domestic commerce clause test of Complete Auto _____________
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279. This conclusion confirms both the _____________ ______
State's legitimate interest in taxing the transaction and the absence of an
attempt to interfere with the free flow of commerce. Second, the tax does not
create a substantial risk of multiple taxation implicating foreign commerce
concerns because Tennessee is simply taxing a discrete transaction occurring
within the State. Tennessee need not refrain from taxing a transaction merely
because it is also potentially subject to taxation by a foreign sovereign.
Moreover, Tennessee reduces, if not eliminates, the risk of multiple taxation
by crediting against its own tax any tax paid in another jurisdiction on the
same transaction. Third, the tax does not prevent the Federal Government from
speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments. The tax creates no substantial risk of multiple taxation, is
consistent with federal conventions, statutes and regulations, and does not
conflict with international custom. Pp. 10-15.
(d) The tax does not violate the Import-Export Clause under the test
announced in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276, 285-286. Because ___________________ ______
Michelin's first component mirrors the Japan Line one voice requirement, and ________ __________
its third component mirrors the Complete Auto requirements, these components _____________
are satisfied for the same reasons the tax survives Commerce Clause scrutiny.
Michelin's second component - ensuring that import revenues are not being ________ ITEL CONTAINERS INT'L CORP. v. HUDDLESTON III ____
Syllabus
diverted from the Federal Government - is also met because Tennessee's tax is
neither a tax on importation or imported goods nor a direct tax on imports and
exports in transit within the meaning of Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of ___________________ ____________
Equalization, 329 U. S. 69, 78-79, 84. Pp. 15-17. _____________
814 S. W. 2d 29, affirmed.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J.,
and WHITE, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and in all but
Parts IV and V of which SCALIA, J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. BLACKMUN, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.